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 Introduction 
 This book started from several assumptions, the key one being that 
although the rise of populism can be regarded as an international trend, it 
may take diff erent forms when investigated in an internationally compara-
tive manner. This book set out to look systematically for both similarities 
and diff erences in populist political communication processes in a vari-
ety of European nations. The previous chapters presented ﬁ ndings from 
several large-scale and comparative studies of populist communication. 
They examined how politicians and journalists perceive populism and 
the role of the media and communication (Part I); populist elements in 
media coverage and the factors explaining their prevalence (Part II); and 
cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral eff ects of populist communication, 
using cross-national survey embedded experiments (Part III). 
 The purpose of this concluding chapter is two-fold. On the one hand, 
we want to tease out and summarize the key ﬁ ndings of the diff erent 
chapters. What do these studies tell us, collectively? On the other hand, 
we want to extrapolate from these ﬁ ndings and the current literature to 
off er concrete stakeholder advice to politicians, journalists, and citizens 
who are all confronted with the challenge of populist politics and populist 
messages. For discussions of the limitations of this research and future 
research directions, we refer the reader back to the conclusions of the 
individual chapters where these are discussed in detail. 
 Key Findings 
 Perceptions of Populism and the Media: Contexts and 
Experiences Matter 
 The ﬁ rst part of this volume took a close look at how journalists and poli-
ticians across Europe perceive populism and the role played by the media 
in its successes and failures. While  journalists did not agree on a single 
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deﬁ nition of populism, they overwhelmingly saw the phenomenon as a 
‘negative force’ having detrimental consequences for European democra-
cies and societies, and this was especially true for countries in which 
populists are in government (see the chapter by Stanyer et al.). Despite the 
absence of a shared deﬁ nition, and limited critical reﬂ ection of the term, 
the journalists from 13 countries could easily identify populist politicians, 
although some only mentioned international examples and refrained from 
naming domestic ones. There were no strong regional patterns of per-
ceptions of populism or systematic diff erences between journalists from 
diff erent types of media outlets. Rather there were commonalities in more 
general perceptions of populism that crossed nations, and diff erences in 
more speciﬁ c questions which pointed to the relevance of speciﬁ c national 
experiences, situations, and circumstances. 
 The journalists interviewed identiﬁ ed a number of reasons for the rise 
of populism. Interestingly, these causes more or less reﬂ ect the ﬁ ndings 
of the scholarly literature (e.g.,  Guiso, Herrera, Morelli, & Sonno, 2017 ; 
 Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012 ;  van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018 ). The 
 demand-side drivers most often mentioned were real-world, macro-level 
developments connected to  immigration and  economic issues , although 
they were attributed varying signiﬁ cance in diff erent countries (e.g., ﬁ nan-
cial crisis, inﬂ ux of refugees). In addition, nationally speciﬁ c issues were 
also mentioned, which were often described as being connected to social 
cohesion (e.g., religion, minorities). This, too, reﬂ ects insights from the 
scholarly debate. Moreover, real-world macro drivers were often seen to 
work alongside supply-side conditions, such as eff ectively communicating 
populist politicians who pick up ‘hot’ issues and capitalize on powerful 
emotions such as hope and fear. Interestingly, most journalists did not 
regard personal characteristics of politicians like charisma to be major 
reasons for populist success, which stands in contrast at least to some 
scholarly reﬂ ections on populism, but is in line with the arguments put 
forward in the context of the COST network (e.g.,  Reinemann, Aalberg, 
Esser, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017 ). 
 In terms of the general eff ect of the  media on populist success, perspec-
tives from diff erent countries also varied a lot. While journalists from some 
countries perceived the media as generally supportive of populist actors 
and messages (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey), journalists from 
other countries saw them as critical (Italy, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, and 
France). In fact, this also corresponds well to prior theorizing and research 
(e.g.,  Esser, Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017 ). Media ownership by political 
actors or strong politics-media ties, a lack of strong journalist standards, 
and economic motives (small media markets) were mentioned most often 
as reasons for media support of populism ( Esser et al., 2017 ). In addi-
tion, in countries with tabloid/popular media outlets, these were generally 
identiﬁ ed as a force promoting populism, although not all scholarly studies 
seem to support this in such clarity (see the chapter by Blassnig et al.). 
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 The cross-national investigation of how  politicians in 11 countries 
view populism and the role of the media also made it clear that national 
contexts matter (see the empirical chapter by Salgado et al.). As with the 
journalists, the interviews did not reveal clearly discernible regional pat-
terns and there were divergent views on the media’s role in spreading or 
containing populism. Greater consensus was apparent, however, regard-
ing the general perception of populism as a negative development with 
potentially harmful consequences for European democracies. And this 
also was true for the issues that were seen as promoting populist success in 
Europe, namely, immigration and economic hardship. Only some referred 
to populism as a force that could strengthen democracies by fostering 
political inclusion of alienated parts of the electorate and boosting politi-
cal engagement. This, however, should not come as a surprise, as most of 
the politicians interviewed were political opponents and competitors of 
populist parties. 
 Interestingly, when asked for the reasons for populist success, poli-
ticians were rather self-reﬂ ective and mainly pointed to the malfunc-
tioning of established democratic institutions, including mainstream 
political parties, in addressing problems and producing convincing dis-
courses and solutions. In contrast to that, politicians, like the journalists 
interviewed, did  not see a strong contribution of individual personalities 
and charisma as a driving force for the attractiveness and success of 
populism, which stands in contrast to parts of the literature (see  Reine-
mann et al., 2017 for a discussion). In fact, politicians were likely to see 
social developments and deﬁ cits on the part of the established political 
institutions to be more important. 
 With respect to the role of the media, both mainstream news and social 
media, politicians generally agreed that they are an important part of 
the equation to explain populist success. In contrast, politicians in some 
countries suggested that the news media were regularly instrumentalized 
by their populist governments. On the other hand, media competition 
and commercialization were mentioned as driving factors that contribute 
to a tabloidization of news-making, which was seen as enhancing the 
chances of populist messages and actors being covered. This, again, is 
very much in line with the arguments put forward in the literature on the 
interplay between populism and the politicized or commercialized media 
(see also Part II of this volume). Moreover, politicians regard social media 
as conducive to populist success because of the opportunities they provide 
for populists in particular to bypass the traditional news media, which is, 
again, quite similar to the arguments put forward in the scholarly debate 
(e.g., Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017). 
 Politicians and journalists thus share the analysis of immigration and 
economic hardship as factors fostering populism and when these are 
salient, individually or in combination with each other, they are conducive 
to populist success. They also agree in that they do not see strong regional 
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patterns, i.e., they did not refer to consistent patterns in, for example, 
Southern or Eastern Europe. Rather they see either overarching interna-
tional trends or national-level factors as more important in explaining 
populist success and the role of the media. Interestingly, politicians and 
journalists seem to diff er somewhat in their interpretation of the role of 
the media. Politicians tend to consider the media as central actors and also 
part of explaining populist success, while journalists tend to  not see the 
media as playing a signiﬁ cant role in the rise of populism. This diff erence 
squares well with several studies comparing perceptions of journalists and 
politicians of the role of the media in democratic processes (e.g.,  Vlieg-
enthart & Skovsgaard, 2017 ; but also see  Fawzi, 2018a ). In connection 
to populism, these diff erences may also be indicative of a problematic 
unwillingness of journalists to accept the fact that they may unwittingly 
support populist agendas and rhetoric by, for example, promoting certain 
issues or applying certain frames. We will get back to this point below. 
 Populism in Media Coverage: Contextual 
and Organizational Drivers 
 The book also reports the ﬁ ndings of a cross-national content analysis 
of a variety of print news media in 12 European countries. Focusing on 
immigration coverage and opinion pieces, the chapters give a comprehen-
sive overview of where populist messages are most common and who are 
their sources (see the chapter by Blassnig et al.). In addition, they identify 
important drivers of the presence of these populist elements on the macro, 
meso-, and story level (see the chapters by Maurer et al. and Esser et al.). 
 In line with the results from the interviews with politicians and jour-
nalists, the chapter by Blassnig et al. concludes that there obviously are 
important national peculiarities with regard to populist messages in the 
media. For example, in line with prior theorizing, results suggest that 
‘the people’ and respective out-groups are deﬁ ned somewhat diff erently 
in diff erent countries. For instance, in some countries, the media convey 
a more cultural or religious notion of ‘the people’ and ‘the others’ (e.g., 
Poland, Israel, Bulgaria). In addition, although anti-elitism was the most 
common dimension of populism in media coverage, countries diff ered in 
which elites were the most frequently criticized (e.g., national, suprana-
tional, or the media elite). Moreover, the relative presence of the in- vs. 
outgroup-oriented dimensions of populism varied, too. In contrast to that, 
a  common feature of coverage across most countries was that higher 
levels of people-centrist messages usually went along with higher levels 
of exclusionary messages. This suggests that media coverage typically 
contributes to perceptions of an antagonism between in- and out-groups 
once people-centrist or exclusionary messages become more frequent in 
the news. This ﬁ nding supports the interviewed politicians’ perception 
that the mass media do initiate the dissemination of populist ideas. 
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 Moreover, the analyses by Blassnig et al. show that there is consider-
able cross-country variance in the presence of individual dimensions of 
populism as well as diff erent patterns of how those dimensions stand in 
relation to one another. This highlights the importance of the chapter by 
Maurer et al., which takes a closer look at several macro- and meso-level 
factors that might encourage, or dampen, the presence of populist ele-
ments in media coverage. Regarding macro-level factors, their analyses 
show signiﬁ cant relationships between the role perceptions journalists 
typically hold in a country and the degree of populism in its newspapers. 
In countries where journalists emphasize an educational role, degrees of 
populism tend to be lower, suggesting that journalists may have the aim 
to shield their audiences from populist messages. The opposite holds true 
for countries in which journalists typically lean towards more supportive 
or adversarial role conceptions. Where journalists perceive themselves 
as facilitators of governments ( supportive role ), regular news coverage 
includes more populist messages, indicating a greater extent of populism 
 through the media. Where journalistic culture is more adversarial there 
also is more ( anti-elite ) populism, especially in editorials and commen-
taries. This suggests a greater degree of populism  by the media in these 
contexts, i.e., the media taking a more political role themselves (e.g., 
 Hanitzsch, 2007 ;  Hanitzsch & Vos, 2018 ). 
 Regarding meso-level, organizational factors, Maurer et al. do not ﬁ nd 
evidence that tabloid newspapers per se tend to include more populist 
messages. This is in line with some prior studies but stands in contrast to 
others ( Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, Wirz, & Wirth, 2018 ). In the data ana-
lyzed here, the mass-market orientation of media organizations  in itself 
did not generally foster populist messaging. The authors conclude that 
it rather is the preference for a news logic that emphasizes political con-
ﬂ ict and emotional cues, which creates favorable conditions for populist 
content. Clearly, more research is needed to disentangle the interactions 
between populists and tabloid/commercial media as well as the country-
speciﬁ c factors that seem to have a crucial impact on the exact functioning 
of this relationship and the part played by tabloid media. 
 In contrast to the previous chapters, the analyses by Esser et al. applied 
a dynamic perspective and compared the presence of populist message 
elements in newspaper coverage in 2016 and 2017. The primary goal 
of this analysis across time was to investigate the relationship between 
certain macro-level situational factors (i.e., migration, political activities, 
audience perceptions of issues) and changes in the degree of populism as 
reﬂ ected in news coverage. Again, results suggest a high degree of country-
speciﬁ city and the authors conclude that intra-media factors seem to be 
the most important explanatory factors for the  changes of populist report-
ing between 2016 and 2017. However, there also is at least some indica-
tion that contextual and situational factors also aff ected populism in news 
coverage, although diff erent factors were inﬂ uential in diff erent national 
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contexts. For example, the degree of populism in the news was obviously 
connected to the actual development of migration in some countries (e.g., 
Germany and Greece;  event-driven ) while in others it seemed to be more 
 politics-driven (e.g., Bulgaria, Poland). In contrast to that, there was no 
evidence for a strong eff ect of the public agenda, which would have been 
indicative of  audience-driven news. 
 Effects of Populist Communication: Identity, 
Deprivation, and the Blame Game 
 Turning to the eff ects of populist communication, the theoretical chapter 
by Hameleers et al. provides a conceptual framework and then the meth-
odological chapter by Hameleers, Andreadis, and Reinemann lays out the 
design of a cross-national experiment. The conceptual chapter integrates 
research on selective exposure, motivated reasoning, social identity, cog-
nitive priming, stereotyping, and blame attribution. It argues that the 
eff ects of populist communication are the result of the combination of 
crisis and group-related rhetoric. As a result, populist messaging entails 
cognitive (perceptions of crisis and deprivation), emotional (fear, in-group 
attachment, out-group anger), attitudinal (images of in- and out-groups), 
and sometimes behavioral consequences (engagement, voting). Remark-
ably, populist communication does not need to change attitudes, because 
it works by priming and trait activation only. However, not everybody 
will be attracted to populist messaging under any kind of real-world 
circumstances. Instead, its eff ects are conceptualized as individually dif-
ferential and context-dependent. Following this theoretical outline, the 
following chapters investigated eff ects of populist messaging using a large-
scale experiment conducted in 15 European countries. In the experiment, 
respondents were shown diff erent versions of a crisis story. The versions 
only diff ered in which groups were blamed for the future economic down-
fall described in the story, reﬂ ecting various kinds of empty left-wing and 
right-wing populism. 
 Corbu et al. investigated  cognitive eff ects of the stories on blame attribu-
tions and stereotyping. These were rather weak in general, which should 
come as no surprise given that respondents were presented just one article 
that was supposed to make a diff erence. However, the analysis was able to 
show that left-wing anti-outgroup cues blaming ‘the rich’ and economic 
elites were most inﬂ uential, that the impact of anti-immigrant cues was 
much weaker, and that both anti-politics and people-centrism cues made 
almost no diff erence. The reasons for these diff erential eff ects seem to be 
complex. For the eff ects of the left-wing out-group cues, the ﬁ t of the spe-
ciﬁ c issue (economy) and the blamed out-group (‘the rich’) was probably 
crucial, whereas blaming immigrants might not be regarded especially 
credible in the economic context of the story. This may have contrib-
uted to the ﬁ nding that anti-immigrant cues did  not increase immigrant 
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blaming in most countries—and even backﬁ red in some contexts (e.g., 
Sweden). 
 In contrast to that, the limited eff ects of anti-politics cues are most 
likely the result of a  ceiling eff ect : because blaming politicians was so 
common and their image so negative across countries, the chances of 
signiﬁ cant  additional negative eff ects were rather small. And, ﬁ nally, the 
fact that people-centrism cues were not inﬂ uential by themselves might 
be traced back to the fact that negative appeals (blame) are generally 
more persuasive. Although these explanations need further investigation, 
the results more broadly suggest that blaming strategies need to ﬁ t the 
thematic issue context in which they are used, because citizens seem to 
see through overly transparent attempts to blame groups that can hardly 
seriously be called out as responsible. 
 With respect to the impact of contextual factors, the analyses by Corbu 
et al. again support the notion that the exact functioning of populist com-
munication seem to be rather country-speciﬁ c. In addition, although the 
idea of regional diff erences may seem appealing at ﬁ rst sight, the data do 
not suggest that regional diff erences are clear-cut or even important. This 
supports both ﬁ ndings from the interviews with journalists and politi-
cians, as well as results of the content analysis presented in Parts I and II 
of this volume. 
 Finally, Andreadis et al. investigated eff ects of populist cues on popu-
list attitudes and voting intentions. Generally, eff ects were again rather 
small. But given that this eff ect can be expected to be conditional on 
individual characteristics and national contexts, it is rather striking that a 
single stimulus had any impact at all. Against this background, the eff ects 
that Andreadis et al. ﬁ nd of people-centrism, anti-immigrant, and left-
wing anti-outgroup cues (‘the rich’) on people-centrism and anti-wealthy 
attitudes, respectively, should neither be over-interpreted nor completely 
neglected. Again, results were very country-speciﬁ c with almost no clear 
regional trends apparent. In some countries, none of the populist cues had 
any impact on the diff erent dimensions of populist attitudes (i.e., Norway, 
Sweden, France, Austria, and Israel) while in others there were speciﬁ c 
cues that resonated with the audience. For example, people-centrism 
cues boosted people homogeneity attitudes in Italy and Spain, left-wing 
anti-outgroup cues negatively aff ected attitudes toward the wealthy in 
Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK, and right-wing 
anti-out-group cues activated anti-immigrant attitudes in Italy and Greece. 
 As far as voting intentions are concerned, at least one of the cues had 
an eff ect on populist voting in ﬁ ve of the 15 countries (Greece, Norway, 
Romania, Sweden, and Switzerland). Remarkably, although the anti-
immigrant cue did not produce strong cognitive eff ects in the analysis 
by Corbu et al., it had the strongest impact on voting for right-wing 
populist parties in Norway. In addition, eff ects were found of anti-elite 
cues on left-wing populist voting (Switzerland); of people-centrism cues 
242 Claes H. de Vreese et al.
on left-wing (Romania) and right-wing populist voting (Sweden); and 
of anti-wealthy cues on right-wing populist voting (Greece, Romania). 
This shows that, depending on the national contexts, the same kinds of 
populist cues might beneﬁ t diff erent kinds of populists parties. This is in 
line with recent research (e.g.,  Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018 ). 
 General Conclusion From the Empirical Studies 
 In sum, there are no simple and across-the-board conclusions about the 
workings of populist communication across Europe. This is an important 
antidote to the pervasive naïve, universalist narrative about populism (see 
also  de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann, & Stanyer, 2018 ). Although 
economic issues and the societal and political discussion about immigra-
tion and integration can generally be regarded as conducive to populist 
success, the dynamics and patterns of populist communication and how 
it is covered and perceived still seem to be strongly aff ected by national 
contexts. For example, although the cross-national analysis of news cov-
erage points to the fact that the most important role of the media generally 
is to provide a platform for populists, some media seem to take a more 
active and political approach, probably crossing the line and becoming 
populist actors at times. 
 The book also highlights that media eff ects on citizens can be found, 
but that these appear to be contingent on whether certain messages are 
repeated (which they were not in our experimental design), whether or 
not certain predispositions are already strongly held (such as in our case 
where ceiling eff ects kicked in), and whether or not the eff ects are expected 
across the board or only for some citizens and in some regions or contexts. 
Perhaps it is encouraging to see that citizens are not swayed massively in 
their responses to a single stimulus material. 
 Implications 
 Based on the book’s ﬁ ndings, the state-of-the art literature, and ongoing 
public and academic discussions about the responses to populism by poli-
ticians, journalists, and citizens, we want to off er some guidance in this 
ﬁ nal section to everybody faced with today’s populist political commu-
nication. We realize that advice already exists in the public domain, but 
we provide it from the perspective of the countries covered here, mostly 
European democracies, and acknowledge that giving advice often means 
overlooking some national nuances. For example, reactions to populism 
in countries where populist parties are in government, have privileged 
access to public service media, or even have their own media organiza-
tions may well be diff erent from reactions in countries where populist 
parties are rather small and put a stronger focus on bypassing traditional 
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news media via online channels. In addition, reactions to populist par-
ties will also depend on whether they share basic democratic values or 
whether they (at least partially) cross the line to authoritarian or even 
extremist positions (e.g.,  Abts & Rummens, 2007 ). We nevertheless feel 
compelled to extrapolate the following lessons from extant research and 
the ﬁ ndings of this book. 
 Journalists and the Media 1 
 Reﬂ ect on Your Role and Be Transparent About It 
 The results of the content analysis have shown that there seems to be a 
connection between journalistic role conceptions and how populism is 
reﬂ ected in the news. In fact, various discussions with journalists also 
seem to indicate that the great uncertainty about how to deal with popu-
lists often is related to a more general insecurity about journalism’s role 
in a liberal democracy under pressure. Therefore, a necessary step for 
journalists and media organizations is to reﬂ ect on their values and their 
role in democracy. Are they more or less passive conveyors of infor-
mation? Is there a point where they feel compelled to explicitly defend 
democratic values or warn against certain actors? What will be the result 
of the position we take and the coverage we base on these decisions? 
These are important questions that media organizations need to answer 
for themselves, and that they need to be transparent about vis-à-vis their 
audiences. 
 Use the Same Standards for Populists and Non-Populists 
 Representatives and voters of populist parties are especially critical of 
the established news media (e.g.,  Fawzi, 2018b ;  Schulz, Wirth, & Mül-
ler, 2018 ). Neglecting, isolating, or judging populist parties by diff erent 
standards might therefore strengthen anti-media sentiments and even con-
tribute to their political success. Belgium’s Vlaams Blok party is a case 
in point. The party was neglected by political opponents and the media, 
and it gained popularity in the wake of criticism of the established parties 
and elite media ( Coff é, Heyndels, & Vermeir, 2007 ). Journalists should 
therefore cover populist actors based on the same standards they use for 
other political actors. 
 Call Out Populists When Democratic Norms Are Violated 
 Although this may to a certain degree depend on the role conception 
journalists identify with, we are convinced that journalists generally need 
to call out populists on norm violations and give voice to critics when 
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foundations of liberal democracy (e.g., separation of powers, rule of law, 
religious freedom, minority rights, freedom of speech and the press) are 
challenged—or when populist parties (or parts of them) cross the line 
toward extremism. Indeed, calling populists out in these cases can be 
an eff ective tool to reduce their legitimacy among potential voters ( van 
Spanje, 2018 ). As aptly put by Michael  Schudson (1995 , p. 217), this 
represents more than just accountability to the voters: ‘The press can serve 
as a stand-in for the public, holding governors accountable—not to the 
public (which is not terribly interested), but to the ideas and rules of the 
democratic polity’. 
 Fact-Check and Correct 
 One of the keys to populist success is its ability to cultivate the percep-
tion that crisis and decline are imminent and that certain groups are to 
blame. If the real-world situation does not justify this portrayal, popu-
lists may make use of misinformation, disinformation, and misleading 
characterizations of reality. In fact, there is some indication even beyond 
Donald Trump that populist actors may be especially tempted to use 
misinformation and fall victim to argumentative fallacies ( Bergmann, 
2018 ; Blassnig, Büchel, Ernst, & Engesser, 2018). Because of that it is 
important to be aware of the results of research on corrections, which 
indicates that although ‘backﬁ re eff ects’ may happen, especially among 
strong partisans, corrections do generally reduce misperceptions (e.g., 
 Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson, & Albarrací n, 2017 ;  Walter & Murphy, 
2018 ). This makes fact-checking and correction important tools when 
scrutinizing the foundations of populist blaming and issue positions. 
Corrections of populist-originated misinformation and disinformation 
then should be done in a matter-of-fact way, ideally provide substan-
tial explanations, and use sources that are close to populist positions 
ideologically. This suggestion also refers to cases in which populists 
present themselves as representing ‘the will of the majority’. Journal-
ists should check those claims, too, and be aware of ‘false equivalence’ 
where some viewpoints held by de facto minorities end up getting as 
much media attention as de facto majorities and appear to represent 
‘the will of the people’. 
 Ask for Details, Foundations, and Consequences 
 When covering populist actors, like any political actors, attention to the 
details, foundations, and consequences of (policy) proposals is impera-
tive. The watchdog function and scrutiny should apply to all (see above). 
Insisting on explanation and justiﬁ cation can be daunting, but it is the 
only way to discover whether populist proposals are realistic or adequate, 
what kind of values and ideas they are based on, whether their portrayal 
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of reality and the blame they attribute is justiﬁ ed, and what consequences 
their proposals would entail. 
 Beware of Populism Through the Media and Do Not 
Fall for Their Strategies of Provocation 
 Although often critical, populists, too, have an interest in getting their 
message across in the news media. Sometimes they exploit journalists and 
media logic by using tactics of provocation, taboo breaking, and strategic 
ambiguity to change and dominate the media agenda or change it to their 
advantage (e.g.,  Gutsche, 2018 ;  Krämer, 2018 ). Although messaging by 
elite actors or political parties is potentially newsworthy, journalists have 
to be aware of the fact that they might inadvertently become a crucial 
part of party communication and success if they only adhere to a passive 
role conception and fall for every outrageous statement or unimportant 
proposal. Journalists should have in mind that sometimes statements may 
be deliberately designed to cause outrage and therefore may also want to 
try to explicitly de-mask this strategy and the motives behind it. 
 Beware of Populism by the Media 
 Research has shown that populist actors—like other political actors—may 
not only beneﬁ t from coverage of themselves, but also from coverage of 
the issues they ‘own’ as well as overly critical coverage of established 
parties and the established political system (e.g.,  Wirz et al., 2018 ). We 
can assume that this is especially true when media coverage becomes 
 media populism , i.e., when the media use the same crisis narratives, 
people-centrism, and blame frames, the same overly generalizing ‘us vs. 
them’, anti-elite, and anti-outgroup perspectives that are characteristic of 
populist communication (e.g.,  Krämer, 2014 ;  Esser et al., 2017 ). Use of 
these kinds of frames may (unwillingly) contribute to populist politicians’ 
success without even mentioning populist actors at all. 
 Be Aware of Bypassing and Digital Tribalism 
 In the coverage of politics in general and populists in particular, there 
should be an awareness that audiences might get an increasing share of 
their information from political actors directly ( Engesser et al., 2017 ). In 
addition, audience worldviews might increasingly be aff ected by (online) 
sources which may not care about journalistic standards or the truth, but 
for whom allegiance to their (digital) ‘tribe’ is key. If established media do 
not take these alternative sources seriously, an increasing gap may appear 
between the world that is presented in alternative and established sources, 
which may in the long-term damage the credibility of all information and 
journalistic media in particular. 
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 Citizens 
 Use news! There is a growing divide in today’s high-choice media land-
scape between citizens that consume news and those who do not (e.g., 
 Hopmann, Wonneberger, Shehata, & Jonas, 2016 ;  Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre, 
& Shehata, 2013 ). News media consumption is unequivocally related to 
political knowledge, political interest, and political effi  cacy, all hallmarks of 
an engaged citizenry. In high-choice media democracies, there is abundant 
choice, but also a responsibility to be informed. Ignorance is no excuse. 
 Be Willing to Pay for News 
 Public information, news, and current aff airs analyses are not only foun-
dational elements of a healthy democracy, they are also commodities, 
and their producers are in search of viable funding models (e.g., Reuters, 
2018). Quality news is costly and requires citizens paying directly through 
subscriptions or indirectly through taxes or license fees. A strong, inde-
pendent, autonomous public broadcaster also correlates with political 
knowledge and interest ( Fraile & Iyengar, 2014 ). But it does not come 
for free. Therefore, it should be self-evident for citizens to be willing to 
pay their share for upholding institutions that are providing journalism 
in the public interest. 
 Be Cognizant of Your Perceptual Screens, 
Filter-Bubbles, and Echo Chambers 
 In a high-choice information environment there is a greater need for citi-
zens to become aware of the information diet they select and the infor-
mation diet that is automatically selected for them (through algorithms 
and digital behavioral traces). Citizens should be aware of the fact that 
their own media behavior and algorithms might put them in an echo 
chamber and disconnect them from other people in society—even though 
it is still disputed how widespread and dangerous this phenomenon may 
actually be (e.g.,  Möller, Trilling, Helberger, & van Es, 2018 ; Zuiderveen 
Borgesius et al., 2017). Likewise, citizens should be aware that their pre-
dispositions, political preferences, and perceptual biases impact on the 
way they interpret new information. It is important in increasingly frag-
mented political and media environments to assess substance and merits 
of information and arguments and not accept them because they conﬁ rm 
pre-existing individual or tribal beliefs. 
 Communicate Responsibly Yourself 
 In today’s environment, the ability to express yourself and share and 
like information has two important consequences: such behavior is an 
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important part of citizens’ public life, their self-presentation, and how 
their network becomes informed. Not all citizens consume and share pub-
lic information like news in the same way ( Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017 ). 
In addition, the way citizens deal with news and information, particularly 
online, is also feeding directly into an environment where clicks, shares, 
and likes might (indirectly) aff ect subsequent news supply. In analogy to 
environmental behavior, citizens also have a responsibility to consider 
their potential information pollution and ‘informational footprint’. This 
means, for example, to use credible news sources, become media literate, 
and refrain from spreading false and misleading information. 
 Politicians 
 Stand Your Ground: Avoid Expedient Policy Shifts 
 The literature has pointed to several consequences of the success of 
populist and radical right-wing parties. A recent study convincingly 
demonstrates that one of the biggest impacts of populist parties is to 
move the policy positions of mainstream parties (see  Abou-Chadi & 
Krause, 2018 ). These authors show that both mainstream left and 
mainstream right parties move their own policy positions in response 
to the success of right-wing populist parties. This highlights the need 
for parties to be cognizant of their own moves, since not only citizens 
respond to these parties, but so do mainstream parties. They should be 
aware of the fact that rhetorical convergence and policy shifts towards 
populists may not have the consequences they anticipate but rather 
beneﬁ t them by lending credibility and legitimacy to their claims (but 
see  van Spanje & de Graaf, 2018 ). 
 Do Not Attack the Free Media 
 Attacking and discrediting the institution of the free press is a common 
denominator of populist political actors. But even if many mainstream 
politicians are distrustful of the media, too, and ﬁ nd that journalists inter-
vene and interpret too much what goes on in politics ( Brants, de Vreese, 
Möller, & van Praag, 2010 ), attacking free media only yields short-term 
gains. A healthy democracy is dependent upon a free press. Moreover, 
trust in the media and trust in politics go hand in hand. If politicians 
undermine public trust in the media, this will backﬁ re on trust in their 
own institutions ( Hanitzsch, van Dalen, & Steindl, 2017 ;  Fawzi, 2018b ). 
Politicians should therefore stand out for supporting rather than under-
mining this core institution of liberal democracies. There is an important 
diff erence between warranted criticism and attempts to systematically 
undermine the credibility of the media. 
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 Be Cautious About Claiming to Represent 
the Will of the People 
 At the core of representative politics is the legitimacy of the elected. It 
is therefore not novel in politics that politicians articulate and appeal 
to the voters and ‘the people’. However, politicians are well advised to 
be speciﬁ c about who they represent, and on the basis of what? Votes, 
polls, gut feelings? Politicians should be cognizant of the limits of certain 
polls and social media utterances as reﬂ ecting public opinion or the will 
of the people. Moreover, they should be careful when interpreting a poll 
conducted in the absence of a public debate. Polls without a public debate 
may look like public opinion and the will of the people but are often not. 
Moreover, caution is warranted by politicians: A key feature of modern 
societies is their pluralism and diversity. Creating the impression that 
there is one homogeneous, common will of ‘the people’ that can easily be 
understood and represented implies neglecting this de facto diversity of 
interests and opinions. 
 Do Not Avoid the Debate 
 When new political entrepreneurs and parties enter and alter existing 
party competition, established (mainstream) parties are, de facto, forced 
to respond. Excluding, neglecting, or ostracizing new political actors and 
parties is generally not a good idea (van Spanje, 2017). So at least as long 
as parties do not cross the line to extremism, engage and embrace them as 
part of the political system and arena, argue back, resist the temptation to 
exaggerate, and de-mask overly simplistic arguments. As a crisis narrative 
is the very basis of populist communication, questioning the diagnosis in 
the ﬁ rst place can be crucial. Are things really as bad as they seem? And 
even if they are, the values and mindset behind policy proposals as well as 
their likely consequences may still be debated. In doing so, be considerate 
of terms and frames used. Consider whether an argument is best thought 
of using your opponent’s or your own terminology. 
 Acknowledge the Emotional Citizen And Citizens’ Emotions 
 It is well known that emotionalized blame attributions inﬂ uence the per-
ception of blame and citizens’ populist attitudes ( Hameleers, Bos, & de 
Vreese, 2017 ). While such use of emotional language might thus be an 
advantage overall, the appeal of emotions has an additional component. 
The raised and sustained success of populism hinges on perceptions of 
economic hardship and immigration. Politicians must therefore not only 
address the ‘rational citizen’, but recognize that politics is also about 
emotions. Acknowledging citizens’ emotions, such as fear and feelings 
of deprivation, and understanding and helping to address these concerns 
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rather than condemning their relevance are important response strategies 
for politicians. 
 *** 
 With this book we have attempted to push the agenda on populist politi-
cal communication. The academic research agenda we presented here 
is comparative in nature. Elsewhere ( de Vreese et al., 2018 , p. 424) we 
have argued that ‘only comparative analysis can reveal and explain simi-
larities and diff erences in the communicative aspects of populism across 
countries’. Furthermore, we believe that future research must broaden 
the scope of what is considered media. In this book we showcased the 
platform function, but the media ecology is changing, with new actors and 
players in the ﬁ eld. These actors, including major social media platforms, 
should be central in further analyses. But they should not be looked at in 
isolation, but rather as part of a larger information system, in which social 
media and their users interact with traditional news media and political 
actors in ever faster news cycles. At the same time, we still know too 
little about key features of social media communication in the context of 
populism when it comes to, for example, visuals, patterns of sharing and 
liking, the relevance of bots and trolls, or the extent of personalization 
and disinformation ( de Vreese et al., 2018 ). 
 Finally, we encourage scholars to not only look at the eff ects of news 
and information. Many citizens have a preference for other formats 
or genres altogether ( Prior, 2007 ). It seems relevant to expand the 
scope to, for example, the role of satire and political entertainment 
more broadly (Boukes et al., 2015). There is some evidence to suggest 
that satirical formats can exacerbate conﬁ rmation biases, such that 
satirical information options lead to less counter-attitudinal exposure 
(compared to hard news), thus potentially reinforcing opinions and 
leading to further polarization ( Stroud & Muddiman, 2013 ). How 
such processes aff ect selection and eff ects vis-à-vis populism remains 
an open question. 
 In closing, we stress again that this is not an academic endeavor alone. 
The topic of our research touches the very foundations of liberal democ-
racies and all actors—whether politicians, individual journalists, media 
organizations, or citizens—need to be aware of and act on the basis of 
what we know about populist communication. At the end of the day, 
the quality of democracy is in great part a function of the quality of this 
communication and the interaction between diff erent actors and groups. 
 Note 
 1 . Some of the recommendations to journalists/media have already been discussed 
in de Vreese (2017). 
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